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Abstract  
In tax behavior research field, two dimensions compiling the “slippery slope framework” are regarded as main 
drivers of compliance, i.e., perceived trust in authorities and perceived power of authorities. The former grasps citizens’ 
cognitions towards the efforts tax authorities render in benevolently supplying public goods. The latter covers general 
cognitions  about  authorities’  capacity  of  detecting and efficiently inflicting punishments on tax dodgers. Following 
interactions which involve both parties of the tax game, a society’s common good is secured through the ensued tax 
compliance level. Nevertheless, like any outcome depending on cooperation, compliance is frail. This happens mainly 
because authorities are called to mediate an ongoing clash between citizens who abide by legal prescriptions, through 
voluntary or enforced compliance, and citizens who eschew them if opportunities arise, through avoidance or evasion. 
Depending on the chosen mediation approach (trust-based or power-based), one type of compliance prevails over another. 
The present writing explores new insights of the framework’s chief dimensions within the perimeter of the Latin American 
interaction  tax  climate  (viz. Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Peru) by dint of economic, fiscal and 
psychological  determinants.  The  proposed  methodological  apparatus  ranges  from  operationalizing  World  Bank 
governance indicators (government effectiveness, rule of law, regulatory quality, control for corruption) as trust and 
power proxies, assessing economic growth through chain base indexes and rating ease of tax compliance based on reliable 
benchmarks (e.g., Paying Taxes indicators, shadow economy, corruption perceptions). The leading goal of the study is to 
make  authorities,  investors,  international  organizations  and  laypeople  cognizant  of  the  role  trust  in and power of 
authorities  play  for  compliance  levels  reached  in  the  Latin  American  tax  climate.  Grounding  decision-making  on 
comprehensive valuations of trust and power may prove cost-effective for any authority concerned with enacting the 
appropriate weighting of tax incentives and enforcement strategies in order to enhance compliance; it may urge taxpayers 
to match the actions of an equitable authority and cooperate; it may serve investors as a guide to determine the efficiency, 
credibility and stability of Latin American fiscal systems; it may assist financing international organizations to detect the 
possible risks and vulnerabilities of the relationship between authorities and taxpayers and evaluate the headway/regress 
registered  by  a  particular  country  within  this  tax  climate.  In  terms  of  trust,  various  countries  in  the  region  have 
implemented solid strategies to sustain competitiveness, infrastructure, innovation or health. In terms of power, several tax 
authorities are deemed as rather weak in mitigating noncompliance. Nevertheless, massive investments in infrastructure 
prove commitment in nixing evasion.    
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1. Introduction 
 
Pinpointing the gist of discovery, Marcel Proust used to say that the real voyage of discovery consists not in seeking 
new  lands,  but  in  seeing  with  new eyes. Trust in authorities  and power of authorities trace the confines for a land of 
perceptions  regarding  tax  behavior,  wherein  both  citizens  and  authorities  can  grasp  additional  meanings  regarding 
compliance, can adopt tax regulations, can adapt fiscal policies and strategies. Following the train of Proustian thoughts, the 
unearthing  voyage  proposed  by  this  paper  consists  in  seeing  trust  and  power  in  the  Latin American tax climate (viz. 
Argentina,  Brazil,  Colombia,  Costa  Rica,  Mexico,  Peru)  with  new  eyes,  i.e.,  understanding,  analyzing  and  explaining it 
with the help of psychological, economic, financial determinants. The aim of the new perspective on trust and power is to 
make authorities, investors, international organizations and laypeople aware of the role trust in and power of authorities 
play in collecting public levies within Latin American tax climate. Adopting macro and microeconomic decisions based on 
ample in-depth assessments of trust and power could prove to be cost-effective for any authority preoccupied to improve 
tax  behavior through  the  means of a balanced weighting between tax incentives and enforcement policies; it could serve 
investors  as  a  tool  for  evaluating  the  efficiency,  transparency  and  stability of Latin American fiscal systems;  it could 
incentivize citizens to obey tax regulations and comply; it could provide international institutions landmarks in identifying 
potential threats for the relation governments-citizens and in measuring the evolution of a certain state pertaining to this tax 
climate.   
As  pointed  out  by  the  “slippery  slope  framework”  (Kirchler,  Hoelzl  and  Wahl,  2008)  [8]  and  its  various  empirical 
investigations on professionals and laypeople (e.g., Kasper, Kogler and Kirchler, 2013; Kogler et al., 2013) [6]-[10], trust in 
authorities grasps taxpayers‟ comprehension  of  authorities‟  endeavor  to  willfully  provide  high  quality  goods  and 
services. Power of authorities captures taxpayers‟ comprehension of authorities‟ ability to uncover noncompliance, chase 
evaders and inflict sanctions for deterring similar future acts. While trust fosters voluntary tax compliance, power increases 
enforced compliance. In addition to disentangling the nature of compliance, the suggested framework raises awareness on 
the importance of tax authorities‟ approach towards contributors: the interaction climate becomes antagonistic if authorities 
use a “cops and robbers” attitude or synergistic if they avail a “service and client attitude”. 
The  paper  is  structured  in the following fashion: section 2 renders few landmarks regarding the Latin American tax 
systems; section 3 explains trust and power through several governance indicators; section 4 draws conclusions.   
 
2. Milestones in the Latin American  tax systems 
 
In  a  comprehensive  view  on  the  economic  history  of  Latin  America  following the  independence,  Bulmer-Thomas 
(2003: 1-5) [4] opines that, besides the language, culture and geographical position, its countries are bound  by colonial 
experience which shaped there economic development. Boasting a large variety in terms of natural resources, economic 
development (low vs. middle income countries; “pockets of wealth” vs. destitution), number of inhabitants (small cities vs. 
megalopolises;  75%  urbanization  rate  and  demographic  booms)  or  political regimes (stable vs. frail democracies), Latin 
America  has  gained  world‟s attention especially in the wake of its economic development started in 2003. By applying 
solid  fiscal  reforms  which  triggered  reductions  in debt levels, increased effectiveness of public expenditures and fiscal 
space  (KPMG,  2012;  OECD,  2011,  2012)  [9]-[11]-[12],  governments  in  the  region  have  attracted rising flows of foreign 
direct investments.   
For a five-decade time span (1960-2012), we determined the average GDP per capita of the Latin American tax climate 
and compared it to global values, with a design to highlight the region‟s economic performances. Figure 1 witnesses the 
conspicuous upsurge of all six economies‟ GDP per capita, following the global trend. This evolution is generally due to a 
hike in the GDP of all Latin American economies considered. Particularly, some aspects are worth to be mentioned. By the 
end of the „70s, except for Argentina (which entered the 1960s with a four-digit GDP) and Peru (with a stable three-digit 
GDP),  the rest of the analyzed countries have turned their GDP per capita from  a three to a four-digit number.     
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Figure 1. Five  decades  of Latin  American  (LA) GDP  per capita  with respect to world 
GDP per capita  (current $US) 
Source: Authors‟ computation based on World Bank Data (1960-2012). 
 
By the end of the „80s, Brazil and Costa Rica have surpassed Argentina. Until the end of 2012, the best performer in 
terms of GDP per capita has been vacillating between Argentina and Brazil. The aforementioned conclusions are supported 
by the chain base indexes (table 1). Although decreasing, the variation corresponding to all four decades remains positive.  
 
Table  1. Analysis of chain base indexes for Latin  American and  World  average GDP  per capita,  1960-2012 
  1970-1979/ 
1960-1969 
1980-1989/ 
1970-1979 
1990-1999/ 
1980-1989 
2000-2012/ 
1990-1999 
Latin American  AV  142.95%  72.7%  94.78%  57% 
World AV  147%  106.21%  68.25%  56.69% 
Source: Authors‟ computation based on World Bank Data (1960-2012). 
 
A  major  culprit  of the Latin American tax climate (Castelletti, 2008; OECD, 2012) [5]-[12] is that the vast majority of 
employees  (e.g.,  90%  in  Brazil,  Colombia,  Costa  Rica)  earn  below  the  taxable  threshold.  Because  of  this,  there  are 
substantial disparities between the number of registered taxpayers and inhabitants: e.g., in Brazil, out of 185 million people, 
20 million are registered contributors. Income taxes represent only 4% of the total fiscal revenues, compared to the OECD 
countries where they amount to 27%. Furthermore, overall fiscal revenues are far from the OECD average (30% of GDP) in 
all countries, except for Argentina and Brazil.    
The Latin American interaction climate between authorities and taxpayers can be somewhat mirrored into the evolution 
of Paying Taxes indicators: number of tax payments (NP), number of hours to comply with main taxes, viz. profit, labor, 
mandatory  contributions,  consumption  taxes  (NH);  total  tax  rate  (TTR).  By  means  of  information  retrieved  from  eight 
Paying Taxes reports (2006-2013) [14], averages of all three indicators were computed and represented in the next figures. 
It is of note that all three indicators record a general decline, in keeping with the world general trend. Notwithstanding this, 
South America has the highest NH, more than twice the world value, the second highest TTR in the world after Africa 
(Paying Taxes 2014  report). Among the indicators, only NP has fallen below the world average.  
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Figure 2. Average  Latin  America and          Figure 3. Average  Latin America and 
World Number  of Tax Payments  (NP)        World  Number  of Hours to Comply  (NH) 
Source: Authors‟ computation based on             Source: Authors‟ computation based on 
Paying Taxes reports (2006-2013).                      Paying Taxes reports (2006-2013). 
 
Starting with 2006, the LANP has been falling short of the WNP as all countries strive to adopt strategies and reforms 
of the tax systems. Of the total NP, 50% involve “other taxes”. Regarding our sample, Colombia has registered the biggest 
reduction  in  NP,  from  68  (2005)  to  10  (2012),  after  introducing  a  unified  online  social  security  contribution  payment 
system (Paying Taxes 2014 report). 
South America has the highest time to comply in the world, with consumption taxes requiring the most numerous NH, 
in  spite  of  authorities‟ efforts to implement electronic filing and payment (Paying Taxes 2014 report). In the same vein, 
figure 3 displays the LANH as being well above the WNH. The result unveils that Latin American countries still lack the 
ability to entirely refine their tax systems in order to attain a drastic step-down in the NH. At the country level, although 
five economies have registered slight decreases of NH, Brazil remains the outlier across the entire period with the biggest 
NH, i.e., 2600  (approx. 108 days).     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                       Figure 4. Average Latin  America and  World Total  Tax Rate (TTR)   
                                     Source: Authors‟ computation based on Paying Taxes reports (2006-2013). 
 
The values embodied in figure 4 illustrate an overall loose drop of the LATTR, underway since 2005, though LATTR 
still remains above the WTTR. The biggest reduction was registered in 2006 when: Argentina operated an abatement in the 
corporate  tax  from  10.7%  (2005)  to  6%;  Costa  Rica  increased  corporate  tax  from  10%  (2005)  to 19.8%, but decreased 
other taxes from 42.8% (2005) to 6.6%; Mexico opted to raise its corporate tax from 5.3% (2005) to 22.4%, but diminish 
labor taxes from  30.2%  in the previous year to 26.9%.  
To conclude, a possible explanation of the entire picture is that, although Latin America‟s indicators slip on a general 
slope thanks to various fiscal reforms and regulations, excessive bureaucracy and threadbare fiscal systems slow down the 
declining  pace  and  make  NH  and  TTR  confront  some  of  the  highest  values  in  the world. Only when authorities will 
become aware that augmenting citizens‟ trust and power could turn the actual climate into a (more) synergistic one, they 
will operate consistent betterment at the fiscal systems (e.g., make the electronic filing and payment available for all taxes 
and taxpayers).    
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3. Trust in authorities and power of authorities  bearing upon the Latin American  tax climate 
 
The ensuing section embarks upon scrutinizing trust in and power of authorities dimensions in the spirit of Batrancea 
and  Nichita  (2014)  [2].  As prompted by the authors, several World Bank governance indicators (Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi,  2010)  [7]  will  be  used  to  appraise  the  two  cardinal  dimensions  incorporated  within  the  “slippery  slope 
framework”.  Accordingly,  trust  will  be  explained  by  means  of  government  effectiveness  and  regulatory  quality,  while 
power will  be expounded through control for corruption and the rule of law. 
The government effectiveness indicator gauges citizens‟ cognitions on the quality of public goods, on strategies‟ outline 
and  enactment,  on  government‟s accuracy in applying certain strategies. The regulatory quality indicator measures the 
extent to which authorities are perceived by citizens as efficient in stimulating private sector growth. The grounds for which 
the  dimension  trust  in  authorities  is  best  appraised  by  these  indicators  are  countless,  as  states  with  highly  trusted 
authorities: have policy makers who design governing strategies based on fairness and efficiency; finance the public system 
which  supplies  quality  goods;  register  high  tax  compliance  rates,  low  tax  evasion  levels  (hence  small  underground 
economies) and thriving economic environments; regard taxpayers as partners in the public goods game, therefore treat 
them with respect. 
Control for corruption measures the degree in which decision makers use public power to acquire personal advantages 
(by engaging in acts of corruption, either grand or petty) and the degree in which public power is controlled by elites and 
interest groups. Last but not least, rule of law appraises general cognitions on compliance with the law (i.e., property rights, 
judicial system, crime and violence perspective, enforcement of contracts).  Power of authorities is properly rated by the 
two indicators for various reasons. Firstly, policy makers and taxpayers meet along the line of legal precepts, the former by 
detecting  and  punishing  tax  noncompliance,  the  latter  by  declaring  all  taxable  revenues.  Secondly,  states  where legal 
precepts are efficiently and thoroughly compelled boast low figures regarding the informal economy and corruption. This 
happens because most civil servants perform their responsibilities out of duty and not to obtain private gains.                   
In the following, we discuss the unfolding of the abovementioned governance indicators across an eleven-year period. 
The sample includes six countries, spread across all Latin American regions (i.e., Middle and South America, Caribbean): 
Argentina,  Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Peru. Percentile ranks among all countries are regarded as yearly data, 
ranging from 0 (lowest) to 100 (highest).      
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., the renowned US Supreme Court Justice, used to state that civilization is bought through 
taxation. It goes without saying that one country‟s level of tax compliance and the effectiveness with which its government 
manages  public  funds  drives  public  goods  quality, which is an expression of civilization. As pointed out in the figure 
below, the analyzed Latin American nations cluster around the middle of the percentile range, with few of them surpassing 
the value of 60. In the eyes of their citizens, governments still have to improve the quality of supplied goods via better tax 
collection  and  wealth  redistribution  strategies. As a matter of fact, some fiscal shortcomings of the Latin American tax 
climate  are  the  narrow  tax base, low level of fiscal revenues and inappropriate structure of public expenditures (OECD, 
2012:  10-11)  [12].  The  outliers  in  terms  of  government  effectiveness  are  Costa  Rica  (closely  followed by Mexico) and 
Peru, the former registering the highest values across the entire period and the later scoring the lowest. 
Costa  Rica‟s  leading  position  within  the  sample  is  certified  by  other  organizations.  Since  2011,  researchers  of the 
ADEN Business School have investigated the competitiveness level of 18 most important Latin American countries which 
generate 99% of the regional GDP [16]-[18]. The variables of interest included: supply of basic needs, institutional features, 
infrastructure, health, education, macroeconomic stability, citizens‟ expectations, efficiency regarding labor rapports, access 
to technology and market competition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                        Figure 5. Government  Effectiveness  (GE)         Figure 6. Regulatory  Quality  (RQ) 
                            Source: World Bank Data (2002-2012).           Source: World Bank Data (2002-2012). 
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If  in  2011  the  country  ranked  fifth,  in  2012  it  managed  to  advance  in  the  ranking  as  fourth  (i.e.,  following  Chile, 
Panama and Mexico) and in 2013 it was designated as the third most competitive country in the region (after Chile and 
Panama). As for public goods quality, various countries ranked first with respect to a particular area: Costa Rica in health; 
Argentina in education; Brazil  in infrastructure; Mexico in efficiency of labor rapports.    
With reference to regulatory quality, except for Argentina, the other countries rank above the middle of the range during 
the entire time span. As figure 6 shows, Costa Rica leads with values around 70, because central efforts of supporting 
private sector growth have been mirrored by citizens‟ growing trust in authorities‟ diligent actions. Due to efficient policies 
concerning  tourism,  industrial  development  and  agriculture  promoted  by  administrations  during  the  last  decade  (i.e., 
following the focus on industrial development promoted by the Asian tigers), Costa Rica has registered great progress in 
the region, being regarded as one of the “tiger cubs” in terms of competitiveness, alongside Panama. Having tourism as one 
of the main drivers of economy, the country has managed to become the most visited region in Central America and among 
the few ones with real ecotourism in the world. 
Governing authorities in Brazil, the biggest economy in the region and the “best placed among the BRICS to achieve 
long-term social solutions” (OECD, 2012: 18) [12], have also witnessed substantial advancement in terms of innovation, 
within  the  past  decade.  Since  2008,  it  has  focused  on  an efficient development policy with financial support from the 
Brazilian  Development  Bank  (BNDES)  and,  like  Mexico  and  Argentina,  Brazil  has  managed  to  match  innovation 
advancements  with  development  capabilities.  Moreover,  the  country  has  experienced  important  progress  in  terms  of 
strategic  planning  capacities  and  engaging  civil  society  in  the  quest  of  mitigating  social  disparities  and  alleviating 
destitution (BertelsmannStiftung, 2014:  8) [3].    
Like aforementioned, the use of public power for personal gains (i.e., either serving interest groups or mere individuals) 
and  inefficient  fiscal  policies  trigger  the  sinking  of  taxable  activities  into  the  underground  economy,  hence  severely 
corroding the power of authorities. When citizens realize that authorities lack capacities in dampening such phenomena, 
their propensity for compliance is replaced by the focus on noncompliance opportunities. The subsequent figures underline 
citizens‟ cognitions regarding control for corruption and the rule of law for the Latin American sample.  The outliers are 
Costa Rica and Brazil,  with long-term strategies regarded as more prominent in counteracting lack of cooperation.        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                             Figure 7. Control  for Corruption  (CC)                Figure 8. Rule of Law  (RL) 
   Source: World Bank Data (2002-2012).              Source: World Bank Data (2002-2012). 
 
In terms of corruption perceptions, the sample records a wide variety, ranging from 40 (Argentina) to 80 (Costa Rica). 
Where governing positions are deemed the chief tool of personal wealth (mainly Argentina, Peru and Mexico), authorities 
are labeled as corrupt throughout the entire decade. A similar path of results is reported by the Transparency International 
Corruption Perceptions Index [15], which in 2012 rated Costa Rica (score 54) as the least corrupt, followed by Brazil (score 
43), Peru (score 38),  Colombia  (score 36), Argentina (score 35) and Mexico (score 34). 
According to analyses commissioned by the IMF with respect to the underground economy (Singh, Jain-Chandra and 
Mohommad, 2012) [13], untaxed activities in this tax climate can upsurge from 20% to more than 40% of the GDP. When 
referring to tax evasion as part of the shadow economy, Castelletti (2008) [5] signals that illegal tax noncompliance may 
not be the main cause of the substantial tax-collection gap, but the limited tax base. Like previously stated, countries in the 
region collect insufficient tax revenues (compared to developing or developed ones) because the vast majority of citizens 
generate incomes below the minimum  taxable threshold.               
Irrespectively of the major driver for increasing shadow economies, authorities within the Latin American tax climate 
have  started  to  implement  various strategies in fighting tax evasion. As tackled in Batrancea et al. (2012) [1], the most 
substantial  investments  and efforts of mitigating noncompliance in the region are made  by the Brazilian tax authorities, 
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which  received  the  moniker  “Lion”  after  their  official  logo.  Making use of 12,000 federal employees, the tax agency is 
considered  one  of  the  best  in  collecting  revenues,  viz.  either regular or overdue payments. For example, in 2011, their 
intense activity triggered an increase of 10.1% in public funds. Due to the agency‟s effectiveness, other state governments 
(i.e., Chile, China, Tanzania) expressed their willingness to learn from the “Lion” and trained staff in Brazil. By favoring a 
“cops  and  robbers”  approach  (e.g.,  assessing  properties‟ sizes by helicopter overflight; monitoring alcohol production 
through beer kegs; raiding locations with special army troops) and increasing power with significant costs, Brazilian tax 
authorities have managed to raise compliance levels on the short run. The forthcoming years will show whether the strategy 
aimed also the long run.          
 
4. Conclusions 
 
Our focus on the Latin American tax climate, represented here by Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico and 
Peru, stems from the significant economic development registered by various nations in the region. During the last decade, 
countries like Brazil, Costa Rica or Mexico have made headlines for implementing efficient governing strategies with the 
aim to mitigate income disparities, boost collection of tax revenues, increase competitiveness on the global market.        
The present research takes the path adopted in Batrancea and Nichita (2014) [2] and adapts it to the Latin American tax 
climate. Accordingly, the two dimensions of the “slippery slope framework”, trust in and power of authorities, are tackled 
by  operationalizing  four  governance  indicators  determined  yearly  by  the  World  Bank,  i.e.,  government  effectiveness, 
regulatory  quality,  control  for  corruption,  rule  of  law).  The  methodology  used  aggregates  evaluations  of  economic 
development  via  chain  base indexes and appraisal of tax compliance process via indicators like corruption perceptions, 
shadow economy or “Paying Taxes” variables. 
As  pinpointed  in  section  2,  the  challenges  faced by countries belonging to the Latin American tax climate  revolve 
around burdensome total tax rates, excessive bureaucracy during the taxpaying (e.g., 2,600 hours needed by Brazilians to 
comply), a narrow tax base, large tax-collection gaps, high levels of shadow economy and perceived corruption and very 
low tax revenue to GDP ratios (in comparison with developed and developing countries). We opine that trust in authorities 
and power of authorities are solid tools in overcoming such challenges and improving general tax compliance. Supplying 
citizens with high quality public goods (e.g., facilitating education, health care, infrastructure) augments citizens‟ trust in 
the governing power, making them more prone towards cooperation. On this line, countries like Brazil and Costa Rica have 
enacted efficient strategies in supporting innovation, infrastructure, health and competitiveness. In terms of power, many of 
state authorities are perceived as rather weak in their fight to damper noncompliance and rising shadow economies. Some 
tax  authorities  have  shown  commitment  in  nixing  tax  evasion  through  massive investments in cutting edge strategies. 
Overall, the most prominent performers of the Latin American tax climate, viz. Costa Rica and Brazil, have registered level 
of perceived power, the former being the most stable country in the region and the latter being among the most important 
emerging markets within BRICS.   
Although the six analyzed countries as well as the whole Latin American region have witnessed significant progress in 
terms  of  tax  compliance,  the  chosen  indicators  come  to  epitomize  the  features  of  the  Latin  American  tax  climate  and 
ultimately call for an overhaul of the country tax systems.      
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